Abstractions in Judgment: Does Construal Level Influence the System Specific Reasoning of Dual Process Theory? by Drejing, Karl
Abstractions in Judgment: Does Construal Level Influence the System Specific
Reasoning of Dual Process Theory?
Karl Drejing
karl.drejing@gmail.com
Recent research have proposed a link between two large theo-
retical bodies, namely the Construal Level Theory (CLT) and
the Dual Process Theory (DPT). The proposed connection is
that DPT systems share characteristics with CLT constructs;
that systems operate at different levels of abstraction. While
these claims have been made, there has been no direct attempt
to scrutinize the implication. The hypothesis that a link be-
tween these theories exists is examined empirically in this pa-
per. We investigate whether people respond in a DPT system
specific way when primed with different levels of construal.
89 high school students were primed with different levels of
construal and performed binary choice judgments of either
easy or hard difficulty. We expected that the percent of correct
judgments that participants made while primed with a low-
level construal would be higher than participants primed with
a high-level construal, in the easy condition. Conversely, we
expected that the percent of correct judgments that partici-
pants made while primed with a high-level construal would
be higher than participants primed with a low-level construal,
in the hard condition. The results indicate that there is no such
connection. We discuss whether this result is due to diminish-
ing priming and/or a failure to replicate other studies.
1 Introduction
As humans, we have the ability to look at the world around
us, study what we see, interpret our perceptions and reason
about our surroundings. Therefore, it is unsurprising that our
attempt to understand this ability to reason and make decisions
at least stem back to the Enlightenment philosopher Condorcet
(1793). Since then, a plethora of theories about judgment and
decision-making (JDM) have been put forward trying to shed
light on this process. The drive to develop theories about JDM
is understandable since it affects our everyday life at both the
micro and macro scale. For example: ”I am about to take a
walk, should I bring an umbrella? ”Which of these two munic-
ipals had the best budget balance five years ago?” The above
questions differ in a temporal domain, and one could argue
that different modes of reasoning are involved when faced with
these two questions.
One of the front-line theories regarding JDM is the Dual
Process Theory (DPT: Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2003;
Stanovich & Toplak, 2012) which describes cognitive pro-
cesses as belonging to two separate systems. These systems,
usually called System 1 and System 2, are characterized as the
intuitive and concrete system (System 1) and the deliberate
and decontextualized system (System 2) respectively (Evans,
2008). However, these systems lack a depiction of the tempo-
ral domain described in the questions above.
Alongside DPT, there is another front-line theory in social
psychology regarding the ability to mentally traverse the tem-
poral domain, namely the Construal Level Theory (CLT: Trope
& Liberman, 2003). The main idea behind CLT is that people
adopt different levels of abstraction when thinking about enti-
ties that are close or far away (Trope & Liberman, 2003). The
levels of abstraction are divided into low- and high-level con-
strual, where the low-level represent the close (proximal) and
concrete whereas the high-level represent the far away (dis-
tal) and abstract (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Proximal events
makes an individual adopt a low-level construal, which makes
objects seem more contextualized and concrete. Conversely,
distal events make an individual prone to adopt a high-level
construal, which makes objects more decontextualized and ab-
stract (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Despite the prominence of these two theories, there have
been few attempts to build bridges between them regardless of
the similarities of the theoretical constructs (Amit & Greene,
2012). In Amit and Greene’s (2012) study about DPT of moral
judgment, they found that some predictions were shared with
CLT. The study differentiated between deontological judg-
ments (favoring the rights of the individual, which is an au-
tomatic emotional response, eg. ”It is wrong to shove her”)
and utilitarian judgments (which favors the greater good and
supported by controlled cognition, eg. ”The needs of the many
outweighs the needs of the few.”). In a suite of three experi-
ments, Amit and Greene (2012) examined the relationship be-
tween cognitive style (verbal vs. visual) and moral judgment.
A working memory task examined whether participants had a
visual or verbal cognitive style. Those with a visual style made
more deontological judgments than those with a verbal style.
Furthermore, they showed that visual interference decreases
deontological judgments, and finally they showed that visual
imagery supports deontological judgments.
Amit and Greene (2012) exemplifies the above findings
with the analogy of closing ones eyes. Caruso and Gino (2011;
in Amit & Greene, 2012) showed that people became more
selfish when they did so. The most interesting part of the
story is the similarity between CLT and DPT when describ-
ing moral judgment: the distinction between ends and means.
Ends and means differ in their level of abstraction according
to CLT (Amit & Greene, 2012) and, as discussed above, also
in whether one makes deontological or utilitarian judgments
according to DPT.
Amit and Greene (2012) suggest that a theoretical link
could be developed between DPT and CLT, since these the-
ories make the same predictions regarding the role of visual
imagery in moral psychology. Hence, it could be argued that
concrete features elicit System 1 and abstract features elicit
System 2. The notion that the two Systems use either ab-
stract or concrete processes has been proposed before, mak-
ing Amit and Greene’s (2012) claims plausible (Evans, 2003,
2008; Stanovich & West, 2000; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005).
If such a link exists then the question is: How can we test
that proposition? One approach would be to induce partici-
pants with a high or low construal. This kind of priming is
a recurring theme in CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Sec-
ondly, we create environments in which participants can make
judgments. Not all judgments in life are of equal difficulty,
and a System‘s efficacy is not generalizable to all situations
(Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2008). For instance, it seems
plausible that when judging what is the most prevalent name in
a distribution of names, that distribution matters. If the names
are distributed in a linear fashion, it becomes harder and re-
quires more computational power. But if the names follow a
power-function, more intuitive, or heuristic, strategies are suc-
cessful (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). System 1, for example,
would thrive in an environment where heuristic strategies can
be employed successfully, while System 2 would be the bene-
factor in an environment which requires more computation and
where biases can lead to erroneous judgments. Thus, if con-
strual level evoke system specific reasoning, we can observe
how that system performs in our environments.
We are able to change the level of difficulty and the level of
construal. This allows us to estimate the proportion of correct
answers when manipulating both difficulty and construal. If
a question category is derived from an easy (power function
like) distribution, we propose that both systems would per-
form well. If, however, the question category is derived from
a hard distribution, there would be noticeable differences in
the systems’ performances. Thus the percentage of correct an-
swers will differ between System 1 and System 2.
Dual Process Theory
By dividing cognitive processes into two systems, System 1
and System 2, the proponents of DPT suggest models for
various cognitive processes such as reasoning, judgment and
decision-making (Evans, 2008). The consensus about the fea-
tures of the two systems is that System 1 is a fast, automatic
and unconscious system, while System 2 is a slow, deliberate
and conscious system (Evans, 2008).
While the consensus, in a broad sense, about the properties
of the Systems is well established, they have been attributed
multiple properties in the narrow sense. The distribution of
attributes that these systems possess sometimes varies from
author to author. Evans (2008) tries to untangle the attributes
to get a general picture regarding what has been done in DPT
research1. In addition to the properties above, System 1 is con-
crete, contextualized and heuristic while System 2 is abstract,
decontextualized and analytic. For example, bias based rea-
soning is the default and employed by System 1, but System 2
can override (or overcome) System 1 to provide analytic rea-
soning (Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).
Klaczynski and Lavallee (2005) elaborate on how such
a process is possible. They argue that the analytic System
2 attempts to construct decontextualized task representations
which remove characteristics that can hinder the use of an un-
derlying logical structure. These representations then facilitate
the effective use of decision-making abilities (Klaczynski &
Lavallee, 2005). In contrast, System 1 is highly contextual-
ized (rich in semantic content, dependent on salient memo-
ries). This can lead to a violation of rules of inference and
decision-making as well as activating stereotypes, strong be-
liefs and vivid memories (Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005). An
example of such an inference violation is the classic ice cream
example in which you get caught in an endless loop: You get
offered strawberry, which you take, then banana which you
like more than strawberry. Then you get offered vanilla, which
you like more than banana. But then you get offered straw-
berry again, which you like more than vanilla. This results in
a A > B >C > A loop which violates laws of logic.
When describing DPT above, one can get the impression
that we must avoid System 1 as much as we can: this is not
the case. System 1 is assumed to be old from an evolutionary
standpoint but should not be viewed as a System that emerged
from the primordial soup in an instant. It is more accurate to
regard it as a module that has built upon old modular cogni-
tive processes (such as vision and attention) and added human
specific modules (such as language and theory of mind, Evans
(2008)). The heuristic nature of System 1, and especially its
belief system (Evans, 2008), makes it inherently effective in
situations where a huge computational load is undesirable and
would not have led to an increase in species fitness.
Construal Level Theory
The main idea behind Construal Level Theory (CLT) is that
people adopt different levels of abstraction when thinking
about entities that are close or far away (Trope & Liberman,
2003). The levels of abstraction are divided into low- and
high-level construal, where the low-level represents the close
(proximal) and concrete and the high-level represents the far
away (distal) and abstract (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Proxi-
mal events in time makes an individual adopt a low-level con-
strual, which make objects seem more contextualized, focus-
ing less on peripheral features. Conversely, distal events make
an individual prone to adopt a high-level construal, which
makes objects more decontextualized and with focus on pe-
ripheral features (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Since its emergence, CLT has been attributed to various
psychological processes such as judgment of moral transgres-
sions (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008a), self-control (Fujita,
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Fujita & Han, 2009),
and emotional intensity (Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale,
2010). Since it is a social phenomenon, few studies have ex-
amined what effect, if any, construal level has on judgment
and decision-making. In addition, few studies have examined
probability assessment as a function of construal level. How-
ever, there are some studies made about the subject, such as
the probability of an event occurring as a function of con-
strual level (Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007; Wakslak, 2012),
and the unattainable attractive alternative‘s effect on choice in
different temporal dimensions (Borovoi, Liberman, & Trope,
2010).
In a series of studies, Wakslak (2012) examined how we
perceive probability as a function of spatial and temporal dis-
tance. Wakslak (2012) suggests that if an event have a higher
probability of occurring (relative to another event), it appears
to be closer to us. In the first study a cat, X, had a probability
PX of having a specific protein and cat Y had probability PY of
having another protein, where PX > PY . The participants were
asked whether one of their two friends, one who lived 3 miles
away and another who lived 3000 miles away, owned cat X or
Y. The results suggest that cat X is more often allocated to the
close fiend rather than the far away friend.
Wakslak (2012) findings that probability is related to close-
ness and thus interrelated with other psychological distances,
are not unheard of. Temporal distance (Eyal et al., 2008a;
Broemer, Grabowski, Gebauer, Ermel, & Diehl, 2008; Carter
& Sanna, 2008), social distance (Eyal et al., 2008a; Broemer
et al., 2008) and emotional intensity (Van Boven et al., 2010)
have all been suggested as legitimate distance measures. The
findings of Wakslak (2012) seem to suggest that probability in
itself could be a legitimate distance measure according to CLT
1Recently, Evans and Stanovich (2013) have moved away from this supposition and has rejuvenated the dual-process perspective.
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framework.
Todorov et al. (2007) enforce the proposal that probability
can be compared to the spatial or temporal distance dimension.
They argue that low probability outcomes are viewed as men-
tally distant conforming with studies by Wakslak (2012) and
thus enable individuals to better discriminate whether a choice
is important to them or not.
Wakslak and Trope (2009) found that priming people with
low- or high-level construals influence unrelated probability
assessments. When primed with a high-level construal a par-
ticipant is more likely to rate an event on an unrelated ques-
tionnaire as less likely to occur. This study is of methodolog-
ical importance to us, since we can use it as a manipulation
check when we manipulate participants’ construal level.
What we can conclude is that spatial and temporal
”closeness” have an effect on how people tend to perceive
probabilities, and that a manipulation of a construal can ”spill
over” into completely unrelated judgment tasks. However,
what we have not seen is if people respond in a DPT system
specific way when primed with different levels of construals.
Decision Environment
The frequency distribution of a phenomenon has proven to
be important when it comes to how good people are at judg-
ing which alternative is the most prevalent (Pachur, Rieskamp,
& Hertwig, 2005). Hogarth and Karelaia (2007) made an ex-
tensive study that examined different heuristics and decision
rules as a function of environment cues weight (noncompen-
satory2 , compensatory or equal weighting), cue redundancy,
predictability of the environment and more. Hogarth and Kare-
laia (2007) found that heuristics (typically placed in System
1) perform better in noncompensatory environments. This is
in line with Pachur et al. (2005) who found that their heuris-
tic also performed better in nonc ompensatory environments.
Regarding the environment, it has been common to speak
of ”J-shaped” and ”not J-shaped” environments. This refers
to whether the frequency distribution of an environment is
formed as a J rotated clockwise or not. Examples of such envi-
ronments are shown in Figure 1 and 2. J-shaped environments
can be considered as noncompensatory in that some events oc-
cur frequently whereas most occur rather infrequently (Pachur,
Hertwig, & Rieskamp, 2013). When the environment is not
J-shaped (or uniform), the performance of heuristics decrease
(Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007; Pachur et al., 2013). Thus, one can
consider the J-shape to signify an environment where judg-
ments are more easily made than in a not J-shaped environ-
ment. Compared to System 1, System 2 will not be punished
in a compensatory environment due to its analytic nature and
use of decision rules (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Stanovich
& West, 2000; Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2003). Eyal, Liber-
man, and Trope (2008b) argues that heuristic judgment leads
to bias, and that this resides in System 1. Analytic reasoning
may override this process, which resides in System 2. Hence,
System 1 will be fast to make decisions in every environment
but its bias can punish it in either one of the environments.
Hypotheses and Requirements
Firstly, if priming a low-level construal leads to System
1 specific behaviour, it can be assumed that the partici-
pants are more prone to use heuristics, which thrive in non-
compensatory environments. Consequently, participants will
have a higher proportion of correct judgments in a non-
compensatory environment when primed with a low level con-
strual. System 2 requires more cognitive capacity and may thus
interfere in non-compensatory environments, leading to erro-
neous judgments.
Secondly, the same logic as above applies for compen-
satory environments and high-level construals. Hence, partic-
ipants will have a higher proportion of correct judgments in
a compensatory environment when primed with a high-level
construal. Our two hypotheses are thus:
H1. Participants who are primed with a low-level construal
should behave in a System 1 specific manner. If they do, par-
ticipants will report more correct judgments in the easy judg-
ment environment compared to what participants primed with
a high-level construal in the same environment will.
H2. Participants who are primed with a high-level construal
should behave in a System 2 specific manner. If they do, par-
ticipants will report more correct judgments in the hard judg-
ment environment than participants primed with a low-level
construal in the same environment will.
Above we have implicitly set up some requirements for our
study; (1) That the construal level priming is successful; (2)
That this manipulation is maintained throughout the experi-
ment; (3) That it is possible to manipulate first high and then
low level construal or vice versa; and (4) that the easy ques-
tions generate more correct answers than the hard questions
and that those questions constitute environments that are easy
and hard respectively. Those assumptions are examined and
reviewed in the Result section.
Figure 1: A sample of the data used in the Name (Hard) category. Note that
the distribution of names is almost linear, with an exception of the two most
common.
2A strict definition of a noncompensatory environment is an environment in which the validities of each cue are greater than or equal to the sum of those
smaller than it (Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999). Other environments are mostly compensatory.
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Figure 2: A sample of the data used in the Surnames (Easy) category. Note that the distribution of surnames is more shaped like a power-function.
2 Materials and Method
Procedure
One questionnaire, the experiment leaders contact informa-
tion, a consent form and a contact form was given to the par-
ticipants. The consent form explained their rights as a research
participant and the contact form gathered the contact informa-
tion that was necessary in order for participants to get com-
pensation. When compensation had been given in the end of
the study, the contact form was destroyed in order to preserve
participant integrity. The questionnaire consisted of binary
choices, construal manipulation and manipulation checks, de-
scribed below. For an example of a form see the Appendix,
where form A is attached in its entirety.
Binary Choice Questionnaire
The questionnaire is composed of two construal manipula-
tions, two manipulation checks and 6 x 2 question categories.
Furthermore, the questionnaire is divided in two parts, each
with its own construal level manipulation. The first part begins
with either a low- or high-level construal manipulation. Suc-
ceeding these are six question categories and a manipulation
check. Then part two begins with either a low- or high-level
construal manipulation, 6 question categories and a manipula-
tion check. Four versions of the questionnaire was used due to
counterbalance reasons. These versions are displayed in Table
1.
In each category, there is a series of binary questions where
one alternative is correct, the other is not. The categories used
were Names, Surnames, Crimes, Education, Population, and
Profession. The question categories were gathered from data
retrieved from the Swedish Bureau of Statistics3 (SCB). These
categories are either hard or easy, as shown in Table 2. Note
that the categories are selected so that they maintain their dif-
ficulty when changing construal condition. Thus, the most re-
cent data (low-level) and data from five years ago (high-level)
are both linear (hard condition) or both power-function like
(easy condition). For example, Names are always hard regard-
less of construal condition and Crime is always easy.
Data regarding Surnames and Education was not available
on SCB‘s website. Surname data was obtained by contact-
ing SCB, who forwarded the requested data. Education data
was obtained by dividing the number of high school students
(Skolverket4) in a municipal with the number of inhabitants
(SCB, 2013) in that municipal. A review of the properties of
each category can be seen in Table 2.
Questions were constructed so that they would maintain
a level of primed abstractness. This was done by applying a
temporal dimension to each question. An example of this tem-
poral dimension in the high-level condition would be; ”Which
of the two following surnames was most common in Sweden
5 years ago? Gustavsson or Svensson?”, Conversely, in the
low-level condition it would be; ”Which of the two following
surnames is the most common in Sweden today, Gustavsson or
Svensson?”. This was done in accordance with Caruso (2010)
who manipulated temporal distance by changing the way the
question was formulated. In the past condition, his manipu-
lation were ”Last month...” and in the other condition ”Next
month...”. This concept will maintain the level of manipulated
construal.
3www.scb.se , retrieved February, 2013
4www.skolverket.se , retrieved February, 2013
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Construal Manipulation
Construal level was manipulated in accordance with Fujita et
al. (2006) where participants were presented with 40 words in
a list. In the high-level condition, they were asked to gener-
ate a superordinate category of a word (for example, ”fruit”
is superordinate to ”banana”). In the low-level condition, they
were asked to generate a subordinate example of a word (for
example, ”banana” is subordinate to the word ”fruit”).
Two independent judges analyze the abstractness of a 40-
word classification task. Judges were asked to assess whether
a participants response is a sub-ordinate or a super-ordinate
category of a word. If the participants gave sub-ordinate ex-
amples of a word it was coded as -1, super-ordinate was coded
as 1 and if it fulfilled neither it was coded as 0.
The two judges’ responses were correlated for inter-judge
reliability and their scores were averaged to create an abstract-
ness index. Higher score on this index suggest a high construal
level and a lower score suggest a lower construal level. A com-
parison is then made between the high and low end of the
index. If participant in the high level condition generate sig-
nificantly more abstract responses than participants in the low
level condition the manipulation has succeeded. The values re-
ported by Fujita et al. (2006) for experiment 3a was: Mhigh =
33.3, Mlow = -34.9, t(42) = 39.5, p <0.001, r = 0.99, and for
experiment 3b: Mhigh = 32.8, Mlow = -37.6, t(42) = 40.5 p
<0.001, r = 0.98.
Table 1: Method-table: This table describe the four questionnaires compo-
nents and in what order they are presented.
Form Component Construal Order
A Construal Manipulation High 1
Judgment High 2
Manipulation Check 1 3
Construal Manipulation Low 4
Judgment Low 5
Manipulation Check 2 6
B Construal Manipulation Low 1
Judgment Low 2
Manipulation Check 1 3
Construal Manipulation High 4
Judgment High 5
Manipulation Check 2 6
C Construal Manipulation High 1
Judgment High 2
Manipulation Check 2 3
Construal Manipulation Low 4
Judgment Low 5
Manipulation Check 1 6
D Construal Manipulation Low 1
Judgment Low 2
Manipulation Check 2 3
Construal Manipulation High 4
Judgment High 5
Manipulation Check 1 6
Construal Manipulation Check
The Construal Manipulation Check (CMC) is built on the find-
ings of Wakslak and Trope (2009), in that people who adopt
different construal also judge unrelated events as more or less
likely to happen. Mainly, this will ensure that the participants
have adopted a high or low-level construal when performing
the trials. If a high-level construal is adopted, participants are
prone to judge an unrelated event as less likely to happen com-
pared to participants who are primed with a low-level con-
strual. Using the framework of Wakslak and Trope (2009) a
7 point scale (1 = very unlikely, 7= very likely) will be used
to answer five questions. An example of such a question is ”A
mother is thinking about adopting a child. How likely is she
to do so?”. Unlike the original likelihood judgment (Wakslak
& Trope, 2009) the scale we used consists of five items (com-
pared to seven) and is in Swedish. It is therefore important
to examine the validity of this scale. This is done by analyz-
ing the first half of the questionnaire, when only one construal
manipulation had taken place, and then compare the mean on
this scale for each condition (low/high construal). If there is a
significant difference, in favor of Wakslak and Trope (2009),
this scale will act as a CMC check. That is, it will make sure
that it is possible to quickly shift from high to low construal
level (or vice versa).
Pilot
A pilot study was conducted with 15 participants (age 20-58
years old). The pilot was mainly conducted to secure that the
construal level manipulation and the CMC have an effect.
Participants got a stripped version of the final question-
naire, containing the construal level manipulation and the
CMC. Seven of the participants started with high-level manip-
ulation and finished with low-level manipulation. The other
eight started with low-level manipulation and finished with
high-level manipulation. In all cases, the surrounding environ-
ment was quiet, but varied location wise.
An abstractness index was constructed by averaging partic-
ipants responses. These responses were highly correlated be-
tween judges (r = 0.92, p <0.05). Participants that generated
high-level attributes had significantly more abstract responses
than those who generated low-level attributes (Mhigh = 32.1
vs. Mlow = -28.5, t(14) = 2.2, p <0.05)
The CMC (which examines if the manipulation above had
an impact) can be seen in Figure 3. Notice that the notches are
far apart regardless of whether you start with a high or low
construal manipulation. But to ensure that the CMC fulfilled
its purpose, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test between the high- and
low-level condition in first and second half of the CMC was
conducted. First: W = 281.5, p <0.001; Second: W = 236.0, p
<0.001.
This implies that there is a difference between the abstract
and the concrete in both the first and the second part. This im-
plies that the construal manipulation and the CMC could fill
its purpose in our main experiment.
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Table 2: Question Categories
Category Name Difficulty Example Questions
Names Hard What name, in each row, was the most common name given
to newborns in Sweden five years ago?
Profession Hard What profession, in each row, was the most common in Sweden five years ago?
Education Hard Which municipal, in each row, had the most number of high-school students in
relation to the municipal‘s population count five years ago?
Crime Easy What crime, in each row, was the most common crime in Sweden five years ago?
Surname Easy Which surname, in every row, was the most common in Sweden five years ago?
Population Easy Which municipal, in each row, had the most inhabitants five years ago?
Note that the example questions above are written as they were in the high-level construal condition.
Figure 3: Abstraction score for the first and second half of the Pilot question-
naire. The Notches represent the confidence interval of the median, lower and
upper whisker represent smallest and largest observed value respectively. The
Box represent the Interquartile Range or 50% of the data.
Participants
101 participants (age 18-19 years old) were recruited from
high schools in the municipal areas of Lund and Malmö. 14
participants could not be used in the analysis due to at least one
of the following reasons: (1) A majority of the questionnaire
was not completed; (2) It was impossible to interpret the words
written in the manipulation section; and (3) The questionnaire
was completed, but the participant had misunderstood the bi-
nary question section resulting in inability to decode it.
Method
Execution
The first stage in the recruitment of participants was to con-
tact school principals in order to get permission to perform the
questionnaire at the schools. Overall, 16 principals at differ-
ent high schools in the municipals of Lund, Malmö and Eslöv
were contacted. When a principal had given permission he/she
forwarded e-mail addresses to the teachers responsible for the
3rd year students (age 18-19). Only 3rd year students were
used because it eliminated the possibility that their consent
would be invalid by Swedish law. The responsible teachers
then got an e-mail regarding the study and a short descrip-
tion of its purpose. A time for data collection was booked with
each teacher who showed interest in participating. 6 classes
were visited across two schools. Each visit lasted 35 minutes
of which five were devoted to asking if the pupils would like
to attend the study and to explain the rights they have as possi-
ble participants. Pupils who decided to attend signed the con-
sent form and spent the remaining 30 minutes completing the
questionnaire. Because of the time restraint, the pupils were
informed that there was a possibility that some may not be fin-
ished in time. Ethical implications of this method are discussed
in the Discussion section.
Rewards have been found to increase motivation in partici-
pants, so that they are more likely to maximize their effort and
less likely to answer at random (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001).
Before the experiment started, participants were told that the
top 20 performers5 in the experiment would receive a cinema
ticket once the results had been examined. Once results were
examined, these top 20 participants were contacted and given
their cinema ticket. Their contact data was then destroyed.
Design
Four counterbalanced forms were randomized across partici-
pants. Each form consisted of a 2 (construal condition: low-
level vs. high-level) × 2 (question condition: easy vs. hard)
mixed design. The first half of the form consisted of a high-
or low-level construal manipulation followed by six blocks of
questions with six questions in each block. These blocks were
either easy or hard (3 easy and 3 hard) and were presented one
after another. This was followed by the CMC, which contained
five questions about likelihood judgments. This procedure was
then repeated, with the opposite construal manipulation and
six new blocks of questions. For a full overview of this pro-
cess see Table 1.
Analysis
Below, the analysis of participants’ performance in the judg-
ment task, (Logistic Regression with Random Effect Mixed
Models) is reviewed. Raw data for this task was long-coded
and contains nine categories (participant nr, raw answer, cor-
rected answer, questionnaire variant, question category, con-
strual manipulation, question order, question difficulty and
question id). The data was analyzed using R version 2.14.1.
Judgment Analysis
In the judgment analysis we concern ourselves with binary
variables. The participant faces a question and then two possi-
5More precisely, participants were told that the top 20 who ”guessed” highest proportion of correct answers would get a cinema ticket. The word ”guessed”
were used to reduce potential stress or discomfort.
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ble answers. One of these are correct, the other is not. What we
are concerned about is the proportion of correct answers each
participant had as a function of construal level and difficulty.
Thus, we have a binary dependent variable and two binary in-
dependent variables. Logistic regression is most suitable for
analysis of categorical variables. Jaeger (2008) and Baayen,
Davidson, and Bates (2008) emphasize that traditional meth-
ods (especially ANOVAs) are inferior, because they do not in-
clude random effect modeling.
Random effect modeling refers to compensation for ran-
dom effects, such as participant or item effects. An implication
of random effect modeling is that variation is modeled through
variance. While variation implies that things are unequal, vari-
ance describes the characteristics of a random variable. Ran-
dom effects are random variables, and hence we model varia-
tion through variance. The data set consists of three variables
where it is desirable to compensate for random effects: par-
ticipant number, question category and also question id. Even
though these categories are not selected purely at random, one
cannot make the argument that they do not, in themselves, af-
fect the result.
When Jaeger (2008) describes this method, he compares it
to an ANOVA and explains why that analysis of categorical
variables is problematic. Jaeger (2008) continues with an in-
troduction of logistic regression and then introduces the mixed
models (see (Baayen et al., 2008)). Below follows a review of
the method of choice for our analysis.
Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression can be viewed as a special case of Lin-
ear regression, where independent variables takes a value of
either 0 or 1. Linear regression is used to to describe some
outcome y as a linear combination of independent variables,
x1 . . .xn, which are commonly called predictors. In addition,
the regression also consist of a random error (ε) and intercepts
(β0 . . .βn). To predict the value of y, we construct a linear com-
bination of our predictors, intercepts and random error:
y = β0+ x1β1+ ...+ xnβn+ ε (1)
The issue with this approach is that we have data that is bino-
mially distributed. Consider our binary questions above. They
can have two values (yes or no) and these are binomially dis-
tributed, which means that for every trial, there is a probability
p of an answer being correct. Repeated over n trials, the prob-
ability p of having k correct answers are:
f (k,n, p) =
n!
k!(n− k)! p
k(1− p)n−k (2)
From the gathered data, we want to predict the probability, p,
that the dependent variable takes a value of either 0 or 1. But
even when doing so we can end up with probabilities larger
than 1. This is because the numerical predictors may have an
unlimited range. What we can do is to calculate the odds of the
probabilities p (correct) and 1-p (incorrect):
odds(p) =
p
1− p =⇒ p(odds) =
odds
1+odds
(3)
We can now describe the odds as an outcome by taking the
product of our coefficients, βn, and raise those coefficients to
their respective predictor value, xn, yielding the equation:
p
1− p = β0 ∗β
x1
1 ∗ · · · ∗β xnn (4)
We then introduce the logit of p, which is a log transformation
of the p values and can be thought of as a link between the log
distribution and the normal linear regression equation:
logit(p) = ln
p
1− p (5)
The logit is centred around 0 which correspond to a probability
of p=0.5, and ranges from positive to negative infinity. We can
now have odds that stretch from positive to negative infinity,
but always generate probabilities in the confines 0 to 1. Hence,
the logit model is linear regression in a log-odds space. Taking
the natural logarithm of these odds turn the model back into
the linear combination described in Equation 1:
ln
p
1− p = ln(β0 ∗β
x1
1 ∗ · · · ∗β xnn ) =
= lnβ0+ x1lnβ1+ · · ·+ xnlnβn (6)
The logistic regression equation can thus be described as:
logit[p(x)] = ln
p(x)
1− p(x) = β0+ x1β1+ ...+ xnβn (7)
We also introduce the logistic function, which takes log-
odds scores and transform them into probabilities. It is worth
noting that the logit is the inverse of the logistic function, giv-
ing us:
logistic(p) =
ep
ep+1
=⇒ logit(p) = ln logistic(p)
1− logistic(p) (8)
Mixed Models
Mixed models are statistical models that are able to contain
both fixed and random effects. Furthermore, it is able to com-
pensate for convenience sampling and handle missing values
more efficiently than traditional analysis of variances. In this
paper, we will compensate for random effects that can occur
among participants and items. The mixed model method is
based on maximum likelihood methods. Baayen et al. (2008)
formalize a mixed model in the following manner
yi j = Xi jβ +Sisi+Wjw j + εi j (9)
where the vector yi j represent the response of participant i to
item j. Xi j is a design matrix, comprised of columns contain-
ing factors and covariates. β is a population coefficient, and
together with Xi j provide the model’s best guess about even-
tual unseen subjects and items. These, in turn, are normally
distributed around zero. However, this is a statistical model,
so we must have some uncertainty and account for random
effects. Si is a matrix (or random effect structure) that is a
copy of Xi j . This is then multiplied with a vector-specifying
participant i. The same is done for Wj which is a matrix that
corresponds to the random effect that various items (e.g. ques-
tions) can have. Lastly, we introduce εi j as residual errors.
A simplification of this model can be written as follows:
y = Xβ +Zb+ ε (10)
The variable y is predicted by Xβ and Zb where Z is a combi-
nation of subject matrix S and item matrix W, and b is subject
and random item effects combined.
Our hypothesis 1-2 is dependent on the estimated propor-
tion of correct judgments, thus that is our dependent variable.
Our first model take a baseline and then introduces random
effect adjustment to the intercept.
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Model A (Is only accounting for whether participants
answered correct or not, i.e. the intercept, and the random
effects that participants, question id’s and question categories
had.):
ln
p
1− p = β0+ γi+q j + fk (11)
where
ai, j ,k (p)∼ Binominal(0,γoi,qo j, fok) (12)
11 describes a baseline β0 and then introduces three categories
namely, participants (γ0i), question categories (q0 j), question
id’s ( f0k) as design matrices associated with the random ef-
fects. The next step is to create models that can test our hy-
potheses. To investigate whether difficulty, construal and/or
the interaction between them fit the hypotheses, we construct
4 additional models.
Model B (In addition to Model A, this model introduce
Difficulty as a variable and the effect that participants could
have on Difficulty) :
βo+ x1β1+ γ0i+ x1γ1i+q j + fk (13)
Model C (In addition to Model A, this model introduce
Construal as a variable and the effect that participants could
have on Construal) :
βo+ x2β2+ γ0i+ x2γ2i+q j + fk (14)
Model D (In addition to Model A, this model introduce
Difficulty and Construal, without interaction, as variables and
the effect that participants had on these two variables) :
βo+ x1β1+ x2β2+ γ0i+ x1γ1i+ x2γ2i
+q j + fk (15)
Model E (In addition to Model A, this model introduce
Difficulty and Construal, with interaction, as variables and the
effect that participants had on these two variables) :
βo+ x1β1+ x2β2+ γ0i
+ x1iγ1i+ x2iγ2i+ x1iγ1i ∗ x2iγ2i
+q j + fk (16)
Where x1 and x2 are dummy coded representing ”Difficulty”
and ”Construal” separately. ε is residual errors and γ is the
random effect that participants have. γ0i is the random effect a
participant has in general and γ1i and γ2i is the random effect a
participant has on Difficulty and Construal separately.
Next, we shall describe how models are tested against each
other to see which the superior model is.
Likelihood Ratio Test
To assess which model is superior to another we conduct Like-
lihood Ratio Tests. The test compares two models, one of
which is a null model (a special case, or simplification, of the
other model) and shows if the alternative model fit the data
significantly better than the null model. Consider two models,
A and B, where A has 1 free parameter and B has 2. B will
always fit as least as good as A (it has more parameters), but
the question is if it performs significantly better. Model A and
B are separately fitted to the data and log-likelihoods are cal-
culated. They are then compared following a chi-square dis-
tribution, calculating whether B performs significantly better
than A.
Akaike Information Criterion
If we were to encounter some models which are better than the
null model but do not differ from one another we consult the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike (1974)). AIC is an
asymptotic estimate of the predictive performance in cross val-
idation. That is, it compares two or more models and discern
which of them best predict the data. Being an asymptotic esti-
mate, it is only valid if the number of data points are numerous
enough. It is important to note that AIC is not a hypothesis test.
An AIC test does not warn if the data fit poorly, it can only be
interpreted in relation to another model. It is therefore useful
for our purpose if two or more models are tied and inseparable,
AIC can then compare these and tell us which of the models
that is preferable.
3 Results
Construal Level Manipulation
An abstractness index was constructed by averaging partic-
ipants responses. Participants that generated high-level at-
tributes had significantly more abstract responses than those
who generated low-level attributes (Mhigh = -31.6 vs. Mlow
= 25.2, respectively), t(86) = 32.1, p<.001. That is, partici-
pants in the high level condition generated significantly more
abstract responses than participants in the low level condition.
The two judges’ scores were strongly correlated (r = 0.83).
CMC
In Figure 4, a boxplot reviewing the scores from the first half
of the questionnaire and the second half of the questionnaire
are depicted. Note that the scores are almost identical; medians
in the first half are equal, although the concrete condition has a
smaller standard deviation. In the second half there appears to
be a difference. However, looking at the scale (1-7) it is doubt-
ful that there could be a difference, due to the high standard
deviation. To be sure, we perform a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
First half: Z = 22366, p = 0.6184; Second half: Z = 20378, p =
0.08. Thus, there is no difference between the abstract and the
concrete condition in either the first or the second half of the
questionnaire.
Figure 4: Abstraction score for the first and second half of the Pilot question-
naire. The Notches represent the confidence interval of the median, lower and
upper whisker represent smallest and largest observed value respectively. The
Box represent the Interquartile Range or 50% of the data.
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Figure 5: Estimated proportion of correct answers for every question category
(First judgment analysis). Dots represent the log-odds scores of the question
categories and lines are the standard error, also measured in log-odds.
The Questions
When analysing the data, a deviation among the question cat-
egories was revealed. Plotting the six questions categories dis-
plays that the ”Education” category differs markedly, in terms
of correct answers produced, compared to the other categories
(see Figure 5). Participants answered 38% correct on average
in this category. This remarkable feat is discussed in the dis-
cussion section. The question was designed to be hard, but this
seems to be an unexplainable bias. We thereby feel that it is
necessary to perform two analyses of the Judgment task: In
the first, the category is included in the models and in the sec-
ond it is excluded.
First Judgment Analysis
This section examines the models described in the Methods
section. A review of each models’ characteristics in terms
of intercepts, estimated predictors and standard deviation are
found in Table 3. Some of the key values for our discussion
are presented below.
Model A (baseline and random effects) displays the esti-
mated proportion of correct answers across all conditions. The
log-odds intercept is 0.30. Transforming this to percent is done
by Equation 8, which is always used when transforming the
log-odds score to the proportion of correct answers. Reviewing
the log-liklihood test for all models, we see that every model
fits the data better than model A (baseline and random effects
only). However, model A reveals that the estimated proportion
of correct answers across the experiment 56%.
Model B (added difficulty) estimates that participants an-
swered 64% correct in the easy environments and 46.7% in the
hard environments.
Model C (added construal) estimates that participants an-
swered 56.4% correct in the high-level construal condition and
54.3% correct in the low level construal condition.
Model D (difficulty and construal without interaction) es-
timates that participants in the high-level condition in an easy
environment answered 65.1% correct. If they were manipu-
lated with a low-level construal, in an easy environment, they
answered 66.9% correct. In the hard environment they an-
swered 47.5% correct in the high-level condition and 49.6%
in the low-level condition.
Model E (added difficulty and construal with interaction)
estimates that participants in the easy environment answered
65% correct if they were manipulated with high construal and
67% if they were manipulated with low construal. In the hard
environment, participants answered 48% in the high level con-
dition and 49.5% in the low level condition.
Looking at Table 4 we see that every model fits the data
better than model A (baseline and random effects). Comparing
model E (added diffficulty and construal with interaction) with
A (baseline and random effects), B (added difficulty) and C
(added construal) yields that E fits the data much better in com-
parison. But it is not the best model according to the Akaike-
table (Table 5); that would be model D (added difficulty and
construal without interaction). A comparison between model
E and D yields no significant difference between the models.
Consulting the Akaike-table result in D being the model of
choice and a basis for our discussion.
Table 3: Log-odds scores for the Models, with and without the Education category. Models without the Education category has the subscript NoEdu. Numbers
within parentheses display the standard error.
Models Intercept Difficulty Construal Difficulty x Construal
A 0.30 (0.23)
B 0.66 (0.25) -0.71 (0.34)
C 0.26 (0.26) 0.08 (0.22)
D 0.63 (0.27) -0.72 (0.34) 0.08 (0.21)
E 0.63 (0.30) -0.71 (0.41) 0.08 (0.31) 0.02 (0.43)
ANoEdu 0.52 (0.12)
BNoEdu 0.66 (0.15) -0.31 (0.24)
CNoEdu 0.50 (0.17) 0.06 (0.24)
DNoEdu 0.63 (0.20) -0.33 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24)
ENoEdu 0.63 (0.23) -0.30 (0.34) 0.09 (0.31) -0.06 (0.48)
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Table 4: Log-likelihood comparisons and Chi-test for Model A-E (With
Education)
Models df logLik Chi-square Chi-df Chi-p
A vs 4 -3811.6
B 7 -3805.1 13.015 3 <0.01
C 7 -3798.7 25.896 3 <0.0001
D 11 -3792.2 38.836 7 <<0.0001
E 16 -3788.5 46.269 12 <<0.0001
E vs 16 -3811.6
B 7 -3805.1 33.253 9 <0.001
C 7 -3798.7 20.372 9 0.015
D 11 -3792.2 7.4322 5 0.190
Table 5: AIC-table for Model A-E (With Education)
Models dAIC df weights
D 0 11 0.7344
E 2.6 16 0.2034
C 4.9 7 0.0621
B 17.8 7 <0.001
A 24.8 4 <0.001
Table 6: Log-likelihood comparisons and Chi-test for Model A-E (With-
out Education)
Models df logLik Chi-square Chi-df Chi-p
A vs 4 -3174.8
B 7 -3172.5 4.473 3 0.214
C 7 -3165.8 17.825 3 <0.001
D 11 -3163.6 22.275 7 <<0.01
E 16 -3158.8 31.836 12 <<0.01
E vs 16 -3158.8
B 7 -3172.5 27.362 9 <0.01
C 7 -3165.8 14.011 9 0.121
D 11 -3163.6 9.5608 5 0.088
Table 7: AIC-table for Models A-E (Without Education)
Models dAIC df weights
E 0 11 0.544
D 5.2 16 0.2034
C 4.1 7 0.0621
B 14.8 7 <0.001
A 24.8 4 <0.001
Second Judgment Analysis
This section examines the five models constructed above with-
out the Education category. Values are presented in the same
fashion as above, with the exception that the models in this
analysis have the subscript NoEdu. A review of each model‘s
characteristics in terms of intercepts, estimated predictors and
standard deviation are found in Table 3. Some of the key val-
ues for our discussion are presented below.
Model ANoEdu (baseline and random effects) display the
estimated proportion of correct answers across all conditions.
The intercept is 0.52, which is the log-odds intercept. Trans-
forming this, we obtain the estimation that participants had
62.9% correct on average.
Model BNoEdu‘s (added difficulty) intercept is 0.57 and the
predictor estimation is -0.29. Transforming these, we obtain
the estimation that participants answered 64% and 57% cor-
rect in easy and hard environment respectively.
Log-likelihood and Chi-square tests are found in Table 6.
AIC values for the models are found in Table 7.
In summation, the only effect removing the Education cate-
gory had was that participants’ had a higher proportion of cor-
rect answers overall and that they had a higher proportion of
correct answers in the hard environment. There are still differ-
ences when comparing environments but no effects are found
when adding the Construal variable. The models of choice for
our discussion below will be model D (added difficulty and
construal without interaction) and E (added difficulty and con-
strual with interaction), which depicts that construal had no
effect on the proportion of correct answers and that the easy
environment generated more corrected answers than the hard
environment.
4 Discussion
Does the of priming construal level facilitate the activation of
different modes, or Systems? Our data suggest that there is a
possibility this might not be the case. Below we will discuss
various interpretations of the results and suggest future exper-
iments that could shed light on these processes.
When discussing the main findings below, we only con-
cern ourselves with the models that include the Education cat-
egory (First Judgment Analysis). This is because categories
were chosen to belong to either a hard or an easy category.
Hence it can be argued that since Education was in the hard
category and was inherently hard for the participants it should
be included in the discussion of our main findings. The only
difference between the the First and Second Analysis was that
the proportion of correct answers across every decision envi-
ronment increased. Acknowledging this and presenting the al-
ternative results above (Second Judgment Analysis) and in the
Appendix, we move forward to discuss our main findings.
Main Findings
Our hypotheses,H1 andH2, suggest that priming participants’
construal levels should produce a change in the proportion of
correct answers across environments. As a basis for our discus-
sion we have chosen model D (added construal and difficulty
without interaction), but we feel the need to also discuss the
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closely related model E (added construal and difficulty with
interaction) because of the interaction term. These models are
very similar and the latter might shed some light on the under-
lying processes.
The result obtained by model D (added construal and dif-
ficulty without interaction) tells us two things: (1) Questions
in the easy environment always have a higher proportion of
correct answers in comparison with questions in the hard envi-
ronment; (2) Changing the construal level does not change the
proportion of correct answers significantly. This suggests that
the criterion that the easy environment would generate more
correct answers compared to the hard environment, is fulfilled.
It does not, however, support our hypotheses H1 and H2; there
is nothing to suggest that there is an interaction between the
variables.
This is why it is worthwhile to review model E (added con-
strual and difficulty with interaction). Patterns regarding the
decision environments, that the easy environment generates a
higher proportion of correct answers than the hard environ-
ment, remains. In fact, it does so in every model. What we
also find is that the introduction of varying construal does not
change the frequency of correct responses. The observed ef-
fect in both these models is too small with a too high standard
error in order for us to jump to a conclusion, other than that an
effect is absent.
What we can conclude is that there is no support in any of
these models for our hypothesis H1 and H2.
Examining the Requirements
Priming occurs frequently in the CLT literature, and manipula-
tion checks are next-to-never used (Fujita et al., 2006; Fujita &
Han, 2009; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Wakslak & Trope, 2009;
Wakslak, 2012). At least we can conclude that we followed the
standard given for construal level manipulation. We also did
conduct a pilot study which examined if it indeed was possi-
ble to manipulate one construal after another and if that ma-
nipulation influenced unrelated probability assessments (ma-
nipulation check). What we found was that using this kind of
manipulation and measure on a larger scale seemed plausible.
If this is the case, we have a non-finding, which would sug-
gest that construal levels do not facilitate the activation of dif-
ferent modes, or DPT Systems. A non-finding could also be
due to a tendency to ignore the seriousness of the experiment
and complete it at random. This is not the case, because if
it were true, the effect of changing difficulty would not have
differed from chance. In addition, there was also the poten-
tial of receiving a reward, which would deter such behaviour
(Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Hence, one can assume that par-
ticipants in general read, reasoned and analyzed the judgments
to be made.
Another possible interpretation is that the manipulation
check is correct and therefore suggests a failure to prime par-
ticipants. This contradicts the judges who deemed the manip-
ulation successful. It would suggest an initial successful prim-
ing which diminishes over the course of the experiment. Since
the questions are constructed in a manner that would maintain
an adopted construal (near the present vs. far from present)
this, again, seems unlikely. Sadly, there is no data to support
either claim, but the ”diminishing construal” seems less likely
than the manipulation being incorrect. However, the Pilot sug-
gest that the ”diminishing construal” explanation seem more
likely as it was successful but lacked the binary choice ques-
tions between construal manipulation and the CMC.
Lastly, we acknowledge that hard and easy questions did
indeed constitute hard and easy environments respectively (see
model B for reference).
The Manipulation of Construal
In this study, we are manipulating construal according to a
method used by Fujita et al. (2006). In the original paper by
Fujita et al. (2006), there were 40 words in which partici-
pants either gave sub or superordinate examples of. These 40
words were never published, only examples from the origi-
nal paper were available (such as singer, king, pasta, bag and
soap). This study required 80 such words per participant, and
hence the author constructed a new version of the task. There
are other construal level manipulations available, such as the
”Maintaining Good Health” manipulation (Fujita et al., 2006),
but this cannot be used in a consecutive order, priming first
high and then low-level construal (or vice versa). The level of
similarity between high and low level manipulation is too high,
risking participant awareness. The construal manipulation was
measured in the same manner as in Fujita et al’s. (2006) pa-
per. Comparing the results to Fujita et al’s. yields a satisfac-
tory resemblance with the original paper. The main difference
was a lower inter-judge reliability: Fujita et al., (2006) Ex-
periment 3a: r=0.99 and Fujita et al., (2006) Experiment 3b:
r=.98; compared to this study: r=0.83.
Although this study is not an exact replica of Fujita et al’s.
(2006) or Wakslak and Trope’s (2009), it does follow the same
principles. Others have also used the Fujita et al. (2006) tech-
nique to manipulate the level of construal. In an imaging study
by Gilead, Liberman, and Maril (2013) it was used success-
fully to manipulate construal level.
Wakslak and Trope (2009) found support for their claim
that construal levels influenced unrelated probability assess-
ments in several sub-studies, each of them manipulating con-
strual by different means (Attribute alignment, Categorization
Priming, ”Why” vs ”How” priming, etc). The overall effects
on the reported likelihood that an event would happen strongly
suggested that priming participants with level of construal had
an effect on probability assessment.
The thoroughness of the studies above put us in a delicate
predicament. Clearly, the priming method has been proved to
work (Fujita et al., 2006; Gilead et al., 2013) as has the unre-
lated probability assessment (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). A bold
statement would be suggesting that we have failed to replicate
their findings. Before such a statement, we must acknowledge
in what ways our studies differ.
Variations of Measure and Method
Wakslak and Trope (2009) used two set of questions in their
probability assessment questionnaire, one with seven and one
with six questions. These questions were preceded by vari-
ous kinds of construal level priming. None of the sets contain
the same items, that is, there are 13 questions in total. Our
study contained two sets with five questions, differing from
the original study, in each. In addition, our study contained the
judgment segment with 36 items between manipulation and
the Wakslak and Trope (2009) inspired segment. One could
argue that the construal manipulation might ”diminish” during
the longer 36-item segment, making the last segment obso-
lete. Studies regarding the endurance of construal level prim-
ing is scarce at best. Magee, Milliken, and Lurie (2010) exam-
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ined the aftermath of the 9/11 catastrophe, finding that people
in power experience less social distance than people who are
powerless. In other words, they construe the event in differ-
ent levels of abstraction years after the catastrophe. However,
that construct happened then and has, in a manner of speaking,
formed the perception and memory of the event. It does not
display that these individuals have been primed for all these
year. The endurance of priming also seem not to be researched,
the above study is as close as it gets. Hence we leave this to
further research.
Fujita et al. (2006) only reviewed 36 items in their con-
strual manipulation. Since this study had 40 x 2 items it is ob-
vious that the author constructed 44 additional items. The im-
pact this had on the judges score are minimal; the inter-judge
correlation and the mean values for high and low construal
level are within acceptable limits (comparing to Fujita et al.;
see Results section).
Pilot Recap
The author was aware that the methodology regarding both
construal level manipulation (Fujita et al., 2006) and CMC
(Wakslak & Trope, 2009) differed from the originals, as dis-
cussed above. It is because of this that the pilot was conducted.
The results indicated that generating subordinate and super-
ordinate categories had an effect on the CMC. Although the
sample size was 14 participants and the questionnaire was
stripped, it provided guidance in the construction of the ex-
periment. Based on the research done by Fujita et al. (2006);
Wakslak and Trope (2009) and the Pilot results, the author felt
confidence in the experimental layout.
However, the Pilot had some shortcomings. Firstly, the age
group (20-58 years old) did not match the target audience for
the main experiment. Secondly, only one participant at a time
performed the Pilot, as opposed to a class of 15 to 30 pupils
in the main experiment. A more accurate Pilot study would
have taken the age and the environment into account, as well
as the binary choice segment between the construal manipula-
tion and the CMC.
Strenghts and Limitations
Procedure
The procedure is, as far as the author is aware of, rather unique.
Participants did not conduct the experiment in a classic ex-
perimental setting. Instead, they completed it in a classroom
with their classmates surrounding them. The main advantage
of this procedure is that the theories is tested outside the con-
fines of a controlled environment. It has been fully established
that CLT and DPT have support in controlled environments,
which makes it necessary (and exciting) to examine them in
other, less controlled, environments.
However, there is a practical and ethical concern regarding
this procedure. When the participants were finished, they left
the classroom, and that could make their classmates uneasy,
especially participants with writing or reading difficulties. Par-
ticipants who were left after the time limit had been reached
were asked if they felt violated because they could not com-
plete the experiment. No participant reported that this was the
case, but the risk can never be discarded completely. In hind-
sight, it is questionable whether this procedure was optimal to
test the hypotheses. The design is the only one the author is
aware of that primes two different consecutive construal lev-
els in one. Therefore, it could have been beneficial to test the
hypothesis in a controlled environment before committing to
field trials.
Design
Some of the weaknesses described above are resolved by the
design. First, the design allows both within and between-
subject analysis. This is especially important because: (1) It
allows analysis of results from questionnaires where only the
first half is complete; (2) The impact of a potential failure re-
garding the priming of a second construal level is diminished.
The design itself has no apparent flaws. Participants were able
to understand what was to be done and in what order. As far
as the author is concerned, the design is more than sufficient
to test the hypotheses of this study.
Analysis
The author believes that logistic regression is the proper
method for analysing the judgment data. Mixed models are
used to compensate for parameters that might have an influ-
ence on the data. One example is the diversity of the par-
ticipants, where diversity can be a variable such as socio-
economic status. We are not concerned with what influence
different socio-economic status has on our result, but we are
not denying that it may have an influence. The ”knowledge”
problem displayed above and the reading or writing difficulties
are variables that can influence our results. The use of mixed
models with random effects minimize such influences but does
not eliminate them (Baayen et al., 2008; Jaeger, 2008).
Further Research
This thesis has generated a lot of questions and not that many
answers. There are several ways in which one might proceed
and I will outline a few of those.
1. Replicate Wakslak and Trope’s (2009) study. Although
Wakslak and Trope’s (2009) findings are supported in the form
of sub-studies, no replication of that study has been made. One
of the fruits of this study is that if construal level was manipu-
lated, according to Fujita et al’s. (2006) standards, then either
we have failed to replicate Wakslak and Trope (2009) study or
the binary choice element disrupted construal level priming.
Which lead us to:
2. The element of disruption. Traditionally, when manip-
ulating construal level, the independent variable is measured
directly after manipulation (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Fujita
et al., 2006; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). But for how long does
construal manipulation endure? It is possible that the binary
choice element disrupted construal level manipulation so that
it fades over time. If that is true, it would explain the CMC re-
sults. There are no studies that have examined construal level
endurance, to the authors knowledge. A proposal for such a
study is to manipulate construal and then give the participants
a task which takes various amounts of time until completed. A
variable that has a strong correlation with construal level could
be measured at the end of such a study to discern at what time
interval construal level diminishes. There are also unanswered
DPT questions to be accounted for, leading to:
3. Conventionalize the study. When trying to build a bridge,
the end result might be better if you stay with conventional
methods instead of novel techniques. A classic DPT rational-
ity measure, such as the conjunction problem (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1983), might have been a better option. The conjunc-
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tion problem refers to a participant‘s ability to apply the con-
junction rule when ranking how likely it is that e.g. Linda is
X ,Y or X ∧Y given a description of Linda. If construal levels
were primed, with a ”Linda” acceding priming, and the out-
come was that low-level construals led to more fallacies then
one would have a strong case concerning a bridge between
CLT and DPT. There are various other classic DPT measures
at ones disposal (see Osman (2004) for a review).
Conclusions
In the introduction we exemplified two questions in which we
thought that two modes of reasoning were involved. Looking
at our results above we find a non-result, but this non-result
has generated a lot of questions. Some of these questions can
be answered by conducting some of our concrete (and doable)
experiments in the Further Research section.
Another thought concerns the use of priming (not the par-
ticular priming used in this study, but priming in general). The
love of priming when it comes to manipulating behaviour is
unprecedented and Bargh (2006) raises a lot of questions on
this topic. Priming has been used for almost 50 years (Higgins,
Rholes and Jones, 1977; in Bargh (2006)), and according to
Bargh (2006) it is time that priming leaves its infancy, and that
we start to ask second generation questions. Such questions
range from: (1) Are there individual differences in priming ef-
fectiveness, to; (2) Which ones are more likely to occur in nat-
ural, complex, environments? The latter question is of real in-
terest. This study was made in an environment which was close
to everyday routine, but the task itself and the fruit of the har-
vest was not. Fischhoff (1996) says that the choice of method-
ology is a gamble between the experimental cave and the real
world. If one narrows and constrain the experiment within this
cave, there is a better chance to make science of what is found,
but the application of it might be solely missed. Conversely, if
one enters the real world and conduct experiments in it, one
might find interesting phenomena. These findings will be eas-
ier to apply, but it becomes harder to make science of what is
found. This study is somewhere in the trenches, and it is the
authors’ view that making this experiment in a more controlled
condition could have benefited the study, since its hypotheses
is within the experimental cave. In retrospect, it would have
been entertaining to leave this cave and enter the world of ap-
plied research.
But what is our main conclusion? It seems reasonable to
suggest, based on the Pilot, priming, and data that construal
level does not elicit system specific reasoning. This statement,
however bold it seems, is not unreasonable. But it does beg
to ask the question: How can we be equally good at judging
which of two entities are the most common from a distribu-
tion of entities ranging from five years ago to today? Sadly,
we cannot answer this question based on the data presented.
A possibility is that the categories are static, which means that
the distribution today is the same as it was five years ago. A
review of the material confirms that this is not the case: the en-
tities move, decreasing or increasing in frequency, across the
distribution in every environment we have examined.
I have made an ambitious study, which generated more
questions than it laanswered. Another study that examines this
subject, and its sub-subjects, is highly desirable.
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Nr ___ 
 
En undersökning om 
Bedömningar 
 
 
 
 
Tack för att du vill delta i denna undersökning! Nedan ber vi att du fyller i din ålder. 
Jag är _____ år gammal. 
 
Högst upp på varje följande sida finns instruktioner om vad du ska göra på just den sidan. 
Om någon förvirring eller otydlighet uppstår kan du kontakta experimentledaren. Det är 
viktigt att du gör enkäten i den ordning som den är ordnad och inte hoppar över några 
sidor. När du är klar kan du lämna in den till experimentledaren.  
Observera att enkäten är dubbelsidig! 
 
Lycka till! 
  
1
Abstrakta Kategorier 
Nedan så ska du efter varje ord ange en så abstrakt  eller övergripande kategori av det 
ordet som du kan komma på. Exempelvis så kan du skriva ”Djur” efter ordet ”Hund”, eller 
”Köksredskap” efter ordet ”Gaffel”. 
Banan  Spade  
Tratt  Stol  
Staket  Skylt  
Orm  Byxor  
Megafon  Soffa  
Fiol  Flygplan  
Fluga  Bandyklubba  
Tåg  Säng  
Sedel  Bänk  
Serie  Cykel  
Fotboll  Mikroskop  
MP3-spelare  Tatuering  
Tidning  Schampo  
Ananas  Lyftkran  
Skida  Oxe  
Staty  Golfboll  
Tå  Bro  
Hammare  Anteckningsblock  
Penna  Sköldpadda  
Docka  Pyramid  
  
2
Vilket är vanligast/störst? 
Nedan finns 6 rader med förnamn. Vilket förnamn, i varje rad, tror du var det vanligaste 
namnet bland nyfödda i Sverige för 5 år sedan? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror var 
vanligast/störst  för 5 år sedan. 
Hannes     Melvin 
 
Emmy   Edith 
 
Rasmus   Loke 
 
Alma   Josefin 
 
Noah   Colin 
 
Saga   Anna 
Nedan finns 6 rader med brott. Vilket brott, i varje rad, tror du var det vanligast 
förekommande i Sverige för 5 år sedan? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror var vanligast/störst för 
5 år sedan. 
Sexuellt tvång/utnyttjande     Hemfridsbrott, olaga intrång 
 
Bidragsfusk mot kommunerna   
Kontakt med barn i sexuellt syfte, 
s.k. "grooming" 
 
Inbrottsstöld   Mordbrand 
 
Falskt larm   Vållande till annans död 
 
Skadegörelse   Hets mot folkgrupp 
 
Stöld och snatteri   Misshandel, ej med dödlig utgång 
 
Vilket är vanligast/störst? 
Nedan finns 6 rader med yrken. Vilket yrke, i varje rad, tror du var det vanligast 
förekommande i Sverige för 5 år sedan? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror var vanligast/störst för 
5 år sedan. 
Datatekniker     Grundskolelärare 
 
Lastbilsförare   Programmerare 
 
Fastighetsskötare   Hotell- och kontorstädare 
 
Sjuksköterskor   Kockar 
 
Kontorssekreterare   Undersköterskor 
 
Lagerassistenter   Förskolelärare 
Nedan finns 6 rader med kommuner. Vilken kommun, i varje rad, tror du hade flest antal 
invånare för 5 år sedan? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror var vanligast/störst för 5 år sedan. 
Botkyrka     Solna 
 
Eskilstuna   Trelleborg 
 
Gotland   Växsjö 
 
Tyresö   Karlstad 
 
Sollentuna   Norrköping 
 
Göteborg   Malmö 
 
4
Vilket är vanligast/störst? 
Nedan finns 6 rader med kommuner. Vilken kommun, i varje rad,tror du  hade störst andel 
gymnasiestudenter i förhållande till kommunens folkmängd för 5 år sedan? Kryssa i det 
alternativ du tror var vanligast/störst för 5 år sedan. 
Botkyrka     Eskilstuna 
 
Borlänge   Norrtälje 
 
Helsingborg   Hässleholm 
 
Gävle   Linköping 
 
Skövde   Falun 
 
Täby   Norrköping 
Nedan finns 6 rader med efternamn. Vilket efternamn, i varje rad, tror du var det vanligaste 
förekommande i Sverige för 5 år sedan? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror var vanligast/störst för 
5 år sedan. 
Lundgren     Nilsson 
 
Månsson   Norberg 
 
Bengtsson   Åkesson 
 
Olsson   Lundquist 
 
Axelsson   Holmquist 
 
Bergman   Engström 
5
Nedan så finns 5 handlingar beskrivna. Din uppgift är att tala om hur sannolikt du tror det är 
att dessa kommer att utföras. Du kanske känner att du inte har tillräcklig information för att 
ge en riktigt bra bedömning; Ingen fara. Svara genom att kryssa i en ruta för varje fråga 
nedan. 
 
Jana funderar på att börja banta. Hur sannolikt är det att hon gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt     Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Kristina tänker på att renovera sitt hus. Hur sannolikt är det att hon gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt     Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Johan funderar på att bli kock. Hur sannolikt är det att han blir det? 
Extremt osannolikt      Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Sven överväger om han ska träffa sin släkt. Hur sannolikt är det att han gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt      Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Nils funderar på om han ska träffa en kompis. Hur sannolikt är det att han gör detta? 
Extremt osannolikt      Extremt sannolikt 
 
6
Konkreta Kategorier 
Nedan så ska du efter varje ord ange ett så konkret exemplar av det ordet som du kan 
komma på. Exempelvis så kan du skriva ”Pudel” efter ordet ”Hund”. Känner du att det är 
svårt att komma på ett konkret exemplar räcker det med att exempelvis skriva ”Min 
mammas hund”. 
Bil  Pappersvara  
Lampa  Flagga  
Hatt  Huvudbonad  
Bok  Tröja  
Tavla  Sked  
Blomma  Torn  
Boll  Båt  
Glas  Hus  
Flaska  Bulle  
Instrument  Grönsak  
Sko  Motor  
Katt  Mynt  
Kopp  Bär  
Möbel  Form  
Matta  Fågel  
Golv  Motorcykel  
Handtag  Hygienartikel  
Påse  Rör  
Dator  Träd  
Behållare  Kalender  
7
Vilket är vanligast/störst? 
Nedan finns 6 rader med förnamn. Vilket förnamn, i varje rad, tror du är det vanligaste namnet 
bland nyfödda i Sverige idag? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror är vanligast/störst idag. 
Daniel   Sixten 
 
Ida   Sofia 
 
Felix   Erik 
 
Lina   Elise 
 
Casper   Neo 
 
Matilda   Vilda 
Nedan finns 6 rader med brott. Vilket brott, i varje rad, tror du är det vanligast förekommande 
i Sverige idag? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror är vanligast/störst idag. 
Innehav av Narkotika   
Fullbordat mord/dråp/misshandel 
med dödlig utgång 
 
Utpressning/ocker   Olaga hot 
 
Bidragsfusk mot A-kassorna och 
Arbetsförmedlingen 
  Dataintrång 
 
Bidragsfusk mot Försäkringskassan   Grov vårdslöshet i trafik 
 
Olovlig körning   
Människorov/olaga  
frihetsberövande 
 
Allmänfarlig vårdslöshet   Sexuellt ofredande 
 
Vilket är vanligast/störst? 
Nedan finns 6 rader med yrken. Vilket yrke, i varje rad, tror du är vanligast förekommande i 
Sverige idag? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror är vanligast/störst idag. 
Skötare och Vårdare   Undersköterskor 
 
Universitets och Högskolelärare      Banktjänstemän 
 
Maskinoperatörer   Försäljare 
 
Barnskötare   
Bokförings- och redovisnings 
assistenter 
 
Administrativa Assistenter    Köks- och Restaurangbiträden 
 
Byggnadsarbetare   Maskinverktygsoperatörer 
’ 
Nedan finns 6 rader med kommuner. Vilken kommun, i varje rad, tror du har flest antal 
invånare idag? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror är vanligast/störst idag. 
Nacka   Borås 
 
Huddinge   Karlskrona 
 
Gävle   Borlänge 
 
Nyköping   Uppsala 
 
Helsingborg   Stockholm 
 
Kungsbacka   Kalmar 
 
9
Vilket är vanligast/störst? 
Nedan finns 6 rader med kommuner. Vilken kommun, i varje rad,tror du  har störst andel 
gymnasiestudenter i förhållande till kommunens folkmängd idag? Kryssa i det alternativ du 
tror är vanligast/störst idag. 
Sigtuna   Nyköping 
 
Haninge   Tyresö 
 
Falun   Jönköping 
 
Lund   Umeå 
 
Kungsbacka   Skellefteå 
 
Luleå   Uddevalla 
Nedan finns 6 rader med efternamn. Vilket efternamn, i varje rad, tror du är det vanligast 
förekommande i Sverige idag? Kryssa i det alternativ du tror är vanligast/störst idag. 
Danielsson   Berg 
 
Lindberg   Isaksson 
 
Lindström   Sandström 
 
Löfgren   Johansson 
 
Abrahamsson   Viklund 
 
Öberg   Mattson 
 
10
Nedan så finns 5 handlingar beskrivna. Din uppgift är att tala om hur sannolikt du tror det är 
att dessa kommer att utföras. Du kanske känner att du inte har tillräcklig information för att 
ge en riktigt bra bedömning; Ingen fara. Svara genom att kryssa i en ruta för varje fråga 
nedan. 
 
Allan funderar på att köpa en ny bil. Hur sannolikt är det att han gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt     Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Katarina tänker på att skaffa en hund. Hur sannolikt är det att hon gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt     Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Stina funderar på att söka till Juristprogrammet. Hur sannolikt är det att hon gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt      Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Tina överväger om hon ska skaffa en ny dator. Hur sannolikt är det att hon gör det? 
Extremt osannolikt      Extremt sannolikt 
 
 
Jacob funderar på om han ska på en fest. Hur sannolikt är det att han går? 
Extremt osannolikt      Extremt sannolikt 
11
  
 
Tack för din medverkan! 
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